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Introduction 1
The Russian railways are one of the economic wonders of the 19 th , 20 th , and 21 st century world. In length of track they are second globally to the railways of the United
States (though China is trying to catch them from below). In volume of freight hauled, they are third behind the United States and China, using the standard measure of tonkilometers. And in overall density of operations -here the standard measure is (freight ton-kilometers + passenger-kilometers)/length of track -Russia is second only to China.
(See Table 1 .)
Russia is a much larger country than either the United States or China, so its rail density (rail track/country area) is lower than that of these other two -much lower in the case of the United States. Since Russia's population density is also much lower than that of these other two (excluding Alaska from the U.S. measure in this case), the Russian railways carry their freight and passengers over very long distances, often through vast, nearly empty spaces; their average length of haul is second in the world, behind only the United States and essentially tied with Canada. Coal and coke make up almost one-third of the freight traffic and have average hauls of around 1500 kilometers, while ferrous metals make up another 10 percent of freight traffic and travel an average of over 1900 kilometers. Many remote shippers and customers have access 1 A valuable discussion of the recent state of the Russian Railways and their reform is provided by ECMT (2004) , from which some of the information in this Introduction is taken.
either to only very poor alternative shipping options by road or water, and/or access to those alternative options for less than the entire year.
Though like most railways RZhD carries both freight and passengers, it is one of the most freight-dominant railways in the world, behind only Canada, the United States, and
Estonia in the ratio of freight ton-kilometers to passenger-kilometers. Measured by the share of freight carried, RZhD is second to none among the world's largest railways in its importance to its country's economy.
The Russian railways are divided into seventeen regional railways, from the October Russian Railways, Rossiiskie Zheleznyie Dorogi or RZhD, since then -including the pooling and redistribution of revenues. This has been crucial to two long-standing policies of cross-subsidization: to passenger operations from freight revenues, and to coal shipments from other freight. These cross subsidies have important implications for reform proposals, as will be discussed below.
The Russian railways were a collection of mostly privately owned and operated companies during most of the 19 th century, though many had been constructed with heavy government involvement and financing. 
The Structural Reform Program of 2001
Although wide ranging railway reform debates took place throughout the 1990s, it was only in 2001 that the broad new "Program for Structural Reform in Railway
Transport" was adopted. The reform program traced its roots back to generalized dissatisfaction with the performance of all of the country's "natural monopoly" sectors in the mid-1990s (Capelik and Slay, 1996; Oding, 2000; Dementiev, 2006) , as well as a direction by President Yeltsin to Railways Minister Nikolai Aksyonenko in 1997 to "draw up a [railways] reform plan that would increase the transparency of … spending and operations while bolstering … profitability". 3 After much discussion and deliberation,  Divestiture from RZhD of non-core, non-commercial assets and activities such as hospitals, hotels, and schools.
Second stage, 2003-2005:
 Creation of RZhD subsidiary or "daughter" companies for freight hauling, longdistance passenger operations, commuter operations, construction and repair, and infrastructure;
 Implementation of non-discriminatory infrastructure access conditions for independent train operators, and sale of some RZhD rolling stock and locomotives to those operators;
 Implementation of a transparent structure for government subsidies for passenger operations, to replace the historic cross-subsidies from freight.
Third stage, 2006-2010:
 Partial or complete privatization of non-infrastructure subsidiary companies;
 Creation of a competitive market for freight and perhaps long-distance passenger operations.
This reform program may be seen to include many standard components of promarket economic reforms urged by entities such as the World Bank and the IMF, including the spin-off of non-core activities, the removal of internal cross-subsidies, privatization, and the creation of competition (World Bank, 2002; Kessides, 2004; Xu, 2004) . However, it was not precise as to just how the restructured system would operate. Early drafts of reform laws specified that private companies could never control the infrastructure, even under long-term franchise agreements -the sort that have appeared in other rail reform plans internationally, including those of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico (Pittman 2004a; Friebel, et al. 2007 ). However, this provision did not survive the legislative process, and the public summaries of the reform plan provided by RZhD listed as one component of the third stage "to estimate the opportunities of setting up several railway companies, competitive and vertically integrated." In addition, the plan details called for more than half of railway rolling stock in Russia to be owned by entities other than RZhD by the completion of stage three -in retrospect, a possible hint at a reform outcome qualitatively different from those that had made up the public debate.
As of this writing, a number of the goals of the three stage reform plan have been achieved, but progress on the others has been slow. 5 RZhD is a "joint stock company" that has raised money on public capital markets and is fully separate from ministries and regulators -though it remains fully government owned. Non-core activities have for the most part been spun off or eliminated. Private companies own about a third of Russia's freight rolling stock -more than half in some categories -and perhaps two-thirds of the rolling stock that remains in the public sector is now controlled directly by RZhD "daughter companies" Freight One and Freight Two (on which more below).
On the other hand, the list of important tasks to be completed remains a long What has been permitted thus far has been movement in the direction of the second option, third-party access, with both a) the creation of multiple "daughter" freight hauling companies of RZhD, some perhaps to be separated from the company in the future (on which more below), and b) slow movement in the direction of permitting access to the infrastructure to new freight train operating companies (TOCs). The first option, complete vertical separation, is certainly not on the horizon any time soon, and 6 On these competing models, see, e.g., G\mez-Ib<Zez and de Rus (2006) and Pittman (2007 At least three significant hurdles remain to the creation of competition through third-party access (or, for that matter, vertical separation). First, as noted above, RZhD continues to be required by the government to cross-subsidize passenger operations from its freight revenues, and to cross-subsidize some long-haul bulk freight movements from the revenues received from other freight hauls. As RZhD quite rightly points out, there can be no fair competition between RZhD and independent train operating companies if the former but not the latter is subject to expensive "public service obligations" such as these. 9 There has in fact been some progress in addressing crosssubsidies on the passenger side, with a portion scheduled to be eliminated in 2011 through the separation from RZhD of all suburban passenger services; on the other hand, an announced cut of one-quarter of the central government's subsidies of longdistance passenger service seems to constitute a step backwards unless those funds are to be made up by local and regional governments. Elimination of cross-subsidies within freight hauling would require a major revision of the entire freight tariff system (on which more below), and that does not appear to be in the cards any time soon.
The second hurdle has to do with the legislative and regulatory framework that any cargo for haulage from and to any geographic location on the infrastructure network. 13 Since in most liberalizing countries the entrants into independent train operations have been either shippers vertically integrating to haul their own inputs or outputs or smaller freight forwarders trying their hand at train operations (Pittman, et al., 2007) , this requirement is on its face unfriendly to TOC entry. RZhD and in fact the Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) as well defend this requirement as necessary for the prevention of "cream skimming" by entrants, but that argument probably has validity only so long as the requirements for cross subsidies are in place. In any case this requirement is likely is the explanation for the absence in the list of existing operators and potential carriers below of any small, regional enterprises.
The fact that the reforms have succeeded in opening up the ownership and control of rolling stock to private firms -both operators and shippers -and that the rolling stock controlled by the private share continues to grow both absolutely and in relation to the RZhD share, and particularly if the advanced age of much of the RZhD rolling stock is taken into account, suggests that at this stage of the overall reforms, the Russian government has in effect created its own unique reform model for the rail sector:
vertical separation, but separation at the level of the back of the locomotive -i.e., with locomotives included as part of the "monopoly infrastructure" -rather than between trains and track.  Class I commodities include coal, ores, timber, and construction materials such as sand, stone, and concrete.
 Class II includes oil, grain, fertilizers, food, and a broad collection of intermediate goods.
 Class III contains finished chemicals and metals, machinery, and most finished manufactured goods.
Individual tariffs in each category are then determined using a declining scale for distance of haul and adjusting for shipment size and charges for loading and unloading.
The overall rationale behind the tariff structure is basically twofold: to encourage longdistance shipments, especially of coal, at affordable rates, and to charge for shipping 14 The relationship between domestic tariffs set under these rules and tariffs on goods intended for export is a complex and controversial one that we do not examine here. See, for example, Dementiev (2006) . each commodity no more than a target percentage of its delivered price. 15 Rates above the regulated tariffs are forbidden, in order to protect shippers from monopolistic abuses by RZhD; rates below the tariffs are likewise forbidden, in order to protect independent operators and carriers from predatory abuses by RZhD.
Even with a multitude of commodity-specific adjustments to this tariff regime, it has been no more consistent with a regime of incipient competition than was its historic U.S. regulatory counterpart. On the one hand, it is widely believed that many of the longest-distance moves of Class I commodities are priced below cost, forcing RZhD to cross-subsidize these hauls by charging higher rates than would otherwise be required for other freight hauls. 16 As with cross-subsidies to passenger operations, RZhD argues that real competition among train operating companies is impossible so long as RZhD alone bears this burden. On the other hand, so far RZhD has been mostly unsuccessful in seeking to adjust its rates downward from the regulated levels when it is faced with competition from either independent operators or motor carriers.
According to the Law on Natural Monopolies, it is a long-term government policy to replace the regulation of freight rail rates by creating competition to RZhD among freight operators and carriers, subject to regulation of the price and terms of access to the infrastructure (on which more below). When RZhD seeks permission to adjust rates for a particular commodity on a particular route, it must demonstrate to the rate regulator (the Federal Tariff Service, FTS) that it faces significant competition there. If it 15 See, for example, ECMT (2004) and Dementiev (2006) . The second rationale is similar to the traditional system of "value-of-service" pricing applied in the United States in the days when rail freight shipments were closely regulated (Kahn 1970) . 16 See Yakunin, supra note 5.
can so convince the FTS, then the transport by rail of that commodity over that route is no longer subject to FTS jurisdiction but is rather subject to the Competition Law, the same as other goods and services sold in Russia.
Under This raises the possibility that in practice the FTS has considered only the issue of whether RZhD faces competition from other rail service providers for particular origindestination pairs -obviously a much higher hurdle in the current situation than if motor and water competition were taken into account.
Freight tariffs charged to shippers by "operators" -companies other than RZhD that own or control their own rolling stock -are partially unregulated. As each regulated tariff consists of two components -an infrastructure and locomotive traction charge (combined) and a rolling stock charge -operators may quote a price to shippers that includes the regulated infrastructure and locomotive charge (which either they in turn pay to RZhD, or the shipper pays directly to RZhD) but an unregulated rolling stock charge. Somewhat remarkably, this deregulation of the rolling stock component of the tariff extends to daughter companies of RZhD such as Freight One and Freight Two (RZhD, 2007a) . The combined RZhD rate is reported to serve as a sort of benchmark for the combined private rate in many situations -but not for commodities like oil and cement, where demand for shipping is high and the RZhD rolling stock inventory is small or outdated or both. In those cases, the market rate charged by private operators may be significantly above the regulated tariff. 
Access charges
If independent operators and/or carriers are to provide service to shippers under either a third-party access or a vertical separation regime, the issue of the price of 18 The private operator Globaltrans includes a brief but useful discussion of tariff regulation on its website, at www.globaltrans.com/about-us/rail-industry-market/tariff-regulation. A more lengthy discussion is provided in Globaltrans (2008) .
access (and other conditions, but we focus on price) to the infrastructure replaces the regulated tariff for freight hauling service at center stage. Especially so long as RZhD is operating trains as well as providing infrastructure service, this in turn is related to the broader issue of how the regulated tariff for a particular commodity move for a particular transport corridor is divided into its individual components.
Thus far the most widely discussed aspect of this issue has concerned the freight car component of payments by shippers and TOCs to RZhD, since a) the reform plan was intended to encourage, and has succeeded in encouraging, the private ownership of 
19
A second issue that will be of increasing importance going forward is the locomotive component of payments to RZhD. As of this writing, there is no formal ability for a TOC to subtract such a component from its payment, and this may account for the fact that there are only about 400 locomotives in private ownership in Russia, most owned by 19 A related issue is the degree to which FAS is able to prevent and sanction such allegedly discriminatory behavior; see FAS (2010) .
companies that operate their own local trains over proprietary "industrial tracks".
20
Nevertheless there is a nominal locomotive component in the Price List 10-01 tariffs that averages about 20-30 percent, and the FTS has proposed making that component more explicit and thus subtractable by operators or carriers supplying their own locomotives -a proposal that RZhD has been resisting.
21
If on-track competition is to be encouraged, however, the more important issue in the longer term is the corresponding charge paid for access to the infrastructure by
TOCs. The issue of the efficiency, fairness, and effectiveness in encouraging competition of particular access charge regimes has been widely debated both in infrastructure sectors broadly (Laffont and Tirole, 2000; Armstrong, 2002; Tardiff, 2006) and in the rail sector in particular (BTRE, 2003; Pittman, 2004b; ECMT, 2005b; Nash, 2005) . It seems to be generally accepted by now that no single access pricing regime can achieve all the goals that might be assigned to it, which include not only encouraging competition among TOC infrastructure users but also efficient allocation of infrastructure users, nondiscrimination among users, the recovery of fixed infrastructure costs, and internalization of externalities.
Most countries that have created a rail access pricing regime have set prices somewhere between short-run marginal cost (with longer run and fixed costs to be made up from government subsidies) and average total cost, with a good deal of infrastructure operator to discriminate against unaffiliated network users -in this case, the owners of private rolling stock and, eventually, independent carriers (Laffont and Tirole, 2000) . Such anticompetitive incentives are the principal problem with -indeed the Achilles heel of -the third-party access model of natural monopolies restructuring (Newbery, 1999; Pittman, 2003) . However, the FAS has not found RZhD's practices to be consistent with this reassuring argument. The FAS has accused RZhD of violating the provisions in the competition law prohibiting the abuse of a dominant position on the market with some regularity over the past 10 years, including the following reported specifics: mention creating incentives for aggressively competitive conduct), opening up locomotive and infrastructure ownership to private firms would be a similarly promising strategy for the same purpose. Instead, the need for investment funds is apparently the driving force behind the serious discussions and various moves toward selling off shares in the RZhD "daughter companies" to private investors. It is to these "daughter companies" that we now turn. "Notwithstanding the large number of private operators in the market, it remains significantly concentrated in the hands of a few large players, including the rail transport companies captive to large Russian industrial groups." (Globaltrans, 2008) Globaltrans and FESCO are certainly first among equals within the ranks of independent Russian operators. (Recall that none of these are "carriers", that is, enterprises that run their own trains over the public infrastructure to any significant extent -RZhD remains the only carrier in Russia at this point.) Globaltrans is a large operator specializing in carrying metals, petroleum products, construction materials, and coal. 43 The company began life as Severstaltrans, the transport subsidiary of the international steel manufacturer Severstal, but became independent in 2008.
Globaltrans is the parent of the New Forwarding Company (NPK). Globaltrans owns around 21,000 freight cars and 18 locomotives, the latter now used only for very short hauls. 44 The company has at different times offered to acquire a controlling share in either Freight One or Freight Two. As noted above, the Russian trade press refers to
Globaltrans as the third member of the "Big 3" of Russian rail operators, along with Freight One and Freight Two. In 2010, Globaltrans won a seven-year loan from the EBRD for renewal and expansion of its rolling stock inventory. Interestingly, the owners of Globaltrans held a 50 percent share in rival operator Transgarant until 2006 and continue to own a "beneficial interest" -apparently not publicly quantified -in rival operator MMK-Trans (Globaltrans, 2008 (Globaltrans, , 2010 The fourth largest of the private operators, also less well known than the likes of TransOil characterizes itself as "the largest private company specializing in the transportation of oil and petrochemicals." The company is reported to own or control over 9 million freight cars. Interestingly, two different Globaltrans GDR prospectuses (Globaltrans 2008 (Globaltrans , 2010 Globaltrans and "a company under common significant influence" with Globaltrans, but no details appear to be available.
As in the reforming railways of Central and Eastern Europe (Pittman, et al., 2007) , several of the privately owned rail operators are subsidiaries of large shippers of bulk commodities. 47 Russian examples include:
 Metalloinvesttrans, the transport subsidiary of Metalloinvest, one of Russia's largest iron ore miners and steel producers. Metallovinvesttrans is reported to control over 9,000 freight cars and to specialize in the haulage of iron ore from its own mines to its own steel mills, but also to haul other materials such as coal and stone for other shippers such as large mining companies NLMK (Novolipetsk Steel) and Mechel. company to which Globaltrans provides freight rail services, leases rolling stock, and provides rolling stock maintenance and payment agency services (Globaltrans 2008 (Globaltrans , 2010 .
A manager for one of the "captive" operators, Dmitry Ryabov of Uralchem-Trans, has predicted that "the captive companies will have up to 50% of the rolling stock fleet, but they will have to perform as operator companies [i.e. to serve shippers other than their parent companies] to lessen their logistical costs." by the daughter companies of RZhD, and in those cases the tariff charged to shippers may differ from the tariff set by the FTS to the extent that the owner of the rolling stock wishes to charge a different rate for its use than the rolling stock component of the FTS tariff. Thus at this point one may say that Russia is in a state of third party access to the monopoly infrastructure, perhaps on its way to complete vertical separation -but only in the globally unusual sense in which "access" is by rolling stock only, not train operating companies, and the "infrastructure" is defined to include locomotives and locomotive and train operation, and with the further caveat that the two largest "third 49 Quoted in Vtorushina, supra note 40.
parties" whose tariffs are partly unregulated are subsidiaries of the infrastructure owner.
Will there ever be independent "carriers", operating their own locomotives and running their own trains over the RZhD track network? Either (but not both, at least any time soon) Freight One or Freight Two seem logical candidates, but if a "controlling" share in either is sold to a private firm only under the condition that RZhD maintains a "blocking" share, that is not independence as usually defined in (for example) competition laws. At least three private operators -Globaltrans, TransOil, and
Baltransservis -own small numbers of locomotives and reportedly have some type of "carrier license" (Globaltrans 2008) , which suggests that they, at least, may be anticipating progress on this front at long last. Of course, to the degree that RZhD were to remain in control of both infrastructure and some TOCs, the usual concerns about nondiscriminatory access to the infrastructure under a regime of third party access would remain.
A final question concerning competition is whether the horizontal separation option is truly off the table, as all appearances suggest but has apparently never been definitively stated. This is the only one of the standard models for railways restructuring that creates competition while fully maintaining economies of vertical integration. "One of the most interesting and difficult applications of the theory of monopolies is to the question whether the public interest is best served by the allotment of a distinct basin to each great railway, and excluding competition there…. It must be admitted that, other things being equal, the … [cost-driven] price fixed by a railway will be lowered by every increase in the demand for its services…. But, human nature being what it is, experience has shown that the breaking of a monopoly by the opening out of a competing line accelerates, rather than retards, the discovery by the older line that it can afford to carry traffic at lower rates." (Marshall 1920 
